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Abstract
Federated learning is a recent advance in privacy protection. In this context, a
trusted curator aggregates parameters optimized in decentralized fashion by mul-
tiple clients. The resulting model is then distributed back to all clients, ultimately
converging to a joint representative model without explicitly having to share the
data. However, the protocol is vulnerable to differential attacks, which could orig-
inate from any party contributing during federated optimization. In such an at-
tack, a client’s contribution during training and information about their data set
is revealed through analyzing the distributed model. We tackle this problem and
propose an algorithm for client sided differential privacy preserving federated op-
timization. The aim is to hide clients’ contributions during training, balancing the
trade-off between privacy loss and model performance. Empirical studies suggest
that given a sufficiently large number of participating clients, our proposed proce-
dure can maintain client-level differential privacy at only a minor cost in model
performance.
1 Introduction
Lately, the topic of security in machine learning is enjoying increased interest. This can be largely
attributed to the success of big data in conjunction with deep learning and the urge for creating and
processing ever larger data sets for data mining. However, with the emergence of more and more
machine learning services becoming part of our daily lives, making use of our data, special measures
must be taken to protect privacy. Unfortunately, anonymization alone often is not sufficient [7, 2]
and standard machine learning approaches largely disregard privacy aspects.
In federated learning [5] a model is learned by multiple clients in decentralized fashion. Learning
is shifted to the clients and only learned parameters are centralized by a trusted curator. This curator
then distributes an aggregated model back to the clients.
Clients not revealing their data is an advance in privacy protection, however, when a model is learned
in conventional way, its parameters reveal information about the data that was used during training.
In order to solve this issue, the concept of differential privacy (dp) [3] for learning algorithms was
proposed by [1]. The aim is to ensures a learned model does not reveal whether a certain data point
was used during training.
We propose an algorithm that incorporates a dp-preservingmechanism into federated learning. How-
ever, opposed to [1] we do not aim at protecting w.r.t. a single data point only. Rather, we want to
ensure that a learned model does not reveal whether a client participated during decentralized train-
ing. This implies a client’s whole data set is protected against differential attacks from other clients.
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Our main contributions: First, we show that a client’s participation can be hidden while model
performance is kept high in federated learning. We demonstrate that our proposed algorithm can
achieve client level differential privacy at a minor loss in model performance. An independent study
[6], published at the same time, proposed a similar procedure for client level-dp. Experimental
setups however differ and [6] also includes element-level privacy measures. Second, We propose
to dynamically adapt the dp-preserving mechanism during decentralized training. Empirical studies
suggest that model performance is increased that way. This stands in contrast to latest advances in
centralized training with differential privacy, were such adaptation was not beneficial. We can link
this discrepancy to the fact that, compared to centralized learning, gradients in federated learning
exhibit different sensibilities to noise and batch size throughout the course of training.
2 Background
2.1 Federated Learning
In federated learning [5], communication between curator and clients might be limited (e.g. mo-
bile phones) and/or vulnerable to interception. The challenge of federated optimization is to learn
a model with minimal information overhead between clients and curator. In addition, clients’ data
might be non-IID, unbalanced and massively distributed. The algorithm ’federated averaging’ re-
cently proposed by [5], tackles these challenges. During multiple rounds of communication between
curator and clients, a central model is trained. At each communication round, the curator distributes
the current central model to a fraction of clients. The clients then perform local optimization. To
minimize communication, clients might take several steps of mini-batch gradient descent during a
single communication round. Next, the optimized models are sent back to the curator, who aggre-
gates them (e.g. averaging) to allocate a new central model. Depending on the performance of the
new central model, training is either stopped or a new communication round starts. In federated
learning, clients never share data, only model parameters.
2.2 Learning with differential privacy
A lot of research has been conducted in protecting dp on data level when a model is learned in a
centralized manner. This can be done by incorporating a dp-preserving randomized mechanism (e.g.
the Gaussian mechanism) into the learning process.
We use the same definition for dp in randomized mechanisms as [1]:
A randomized mechanism M : D → R, with domain D and range R satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, if for any two adjacent inputs d, d′ ∈ D and for any subset of outputs S ⊆ R it holds that
P [M(d) ∈ S] ≤ eǫPr[M(d′) ∈ S] + δ. In this definition, δ accounts for the probability that plain
ǫ-differential privacy is broken.
The Gaussian mechanism (GM) approximates a real valued function f : D → Rwith a differentially
private mechanism. Specifically, a GM adds Gaussian noise calibrated to the functions data set
sensitivity Sf . This sensitivity is defined as the maximum of the absolute distance ‖f(d)− f(d
′)‖2,
where d′ and d are two adjacent inputs. A GM is then defined asM(d) = f(d) +N (0, σ2S2f ).
In the following we assume that σ and ǫ are fixed and evaluate an inquiry to the GM about a single
approximation of f(d). We can then bound the probability that ǫ-dp is broken according to: δ ≤
4
5
exp(−(σǫ)2/2) (Theorem 3.22 in [4]). It should be noted that δ is accumulative and grows if the
consecutive inquiries to the GM. Therefore, to protect privacy, an accountant keeps track of δ. Once
a certain threshold for δ is reached, the GM shall not answer any new inquires.
Recently, [1] proposed a differentially private stochastic gradient descent algorithm (dp-SGD). dp-
SGD works similar to mini-batch gradient descent but the gradient averaging step is approximated
by a GM. In addition, the mini-batches are allocated through random sampling of the data. For
ǫ being fixed, a privacy accountant keeps track of δ and stops training once a threshold is reached.
Intuitively, this means training is stopped once the probability that the learned model reveals whether
a certain data point is part of the training set exceeds a certain threshold.
2
2.3 Client-sided differential privacy in federated optimization
We propose to incorporate a randomized mechanism into federated learning. However, opposed to
[1] we do not aim at protecting a single data point’s contribution in learning a model. Instead, we
aim at protecting a whole client’s data set. That is, we want to ensure that a learned model does
not reveal whether a client participated during decentralized training while maintaining high model
performance.
3 Method
In the framework of federated optimization [5], the central curator averages client models (i.e.
weight matrices) after each communication round. In our proposed algorithm, we will alter and
approximate this averaging with a randomized mechanism. This is done to hide a single client’s
contribution within the aggregation and thus within the entire decentralized learning procedure.
The randomized mechanism we use to approximate the average consists of two steps:
1. Random sub-sampling: Let K be the total number of clients. In each communication
round a random subset Zt of size mt ≤ K is sampled. The curator then distributes the
central model wt to only these clients. The central model is optimized by the clients’ on
their data. The clients in Zt now hold distinct local models {wk}
mt
k=0. The difference
between the optimized local model and the central model will be referred to as client k’s
update∆wk = wk−wt. The updates are sent back to the central curator at the end of each
communication round.
2. Distorting: A Gaussian mechanism is used to distort the sum of all updates. This requires
knowledge about the set’s sensitivity with respect to the summing operation. We can en-
force a certain sensitivity by using scaled versions instead of the true updates: △w¯k =
△wk/max(1, ‖△w
k‖2
S
). Scaling ensures that the second norm is limited ∀k, ‖△w¯k‖2 < S.
The sensitivity of the scaled updates with respect to the summing operation is thus upper
bounded by S. The GM now adds noise (scaled to sensitivity S) to the sum of all scaled
updates. Dividing the GM’s output by mt yields an approximation to the true average of
all client’s updates, while preventing leakage of crucial information about an individual.
A new central model wt+1 is allocated by adding this approximation to the current central model
wt.
wt+1 = wt +
1
mt
(
Sum of updates clipped at S︷ ︸︸ ︷
mt∑
k=0
△wk/max(1,
‖△wk‖2
S
)+
Noise scaled to S︷ ︸︸ ︷
N (0, σ2S2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gaussian mechanism approximating sum of updates
)
When factorizing 1/mt into the Gaussian mechanism, we notice that the average’s distortion is
governed by the noise variance S2σ2/m. However, this distortion should not exceed a certain limit.
Otherwise too much information from the sub-sampled average is destroyed by the added noise
and there will not be any learning progress. GM and random sub-sampling are both randomized
mechanisms. (Indeed, [1] used exactly this kind of average approximation in dp-SGD. However,
there it is used for gradient averaging, hiding a single data point’s gradient at every iteration). Thus,
σ andm also define the privacy loss incurred when the randomized mechanism provides an average
approximation.
In order to keep track of this privacy loss, we make use of the moments accountant as proposed by
Abadi et al. [1]. This accounting method provides much tighter bounds on the incurred privacy loss
than the standard composition theorem (3.14 in [4]). Each time the curator allocates a new model,
the accountant evaluates δ given ǫ, σ and m. Training shall be stopped once δ reaches a certain
threshold, i.e. the likelihood, that a clients contribution is revealed gets too high. The choice of a
threshold for δ depends on the total amount of clients K . To ascertain that privacy for many is not
preserved at the expense of revealing total information about a few, we have to ensure that δ ≪ 1
K
,
refer to [4] chapter 2.3 for more details.
Choosing S: When clipping the contributions, there is a trade-off. On the one hand, S should be
chosen small such that the noise variance stays small. On the other hand, one wants to maintain
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as much of the original contributions as possible. Following a procedure proposed by [1], in each
communication roundwe calculate the median norm of all unclipped contributions and use this as the
clipping bound S = median{△wk}k∈Zt . We do not use a randomised mechanism for computing
the median, which, strictly speaking, is a violation of privacy. However, the information leakage
through the median is small (Future work will contain such a privacy measure).
Choosing σ andm: for fixed S, the ratio r = σ2/m governs distortion and privacy loss. It follows
that the higher σ and the lowerm, the higher the privacy loss. The privacy accountant tells us that for
fixed r = σ2/m, i.e. for the same level of distortion, privacy loss is smaller for σ andm both being
small. An upper bound on the distortion rate r and a lower bound on the number of sub-sampled
clients m¯ would thus lead to a choice of σ. A lower bound on m is, however, hard to estimate.
That is, because data in federated settings is non-IID and contributions from clients might be very
distinct. We therefore define the between clients variance Vc as a measure of similarity between
clients’ updates.
Definition. Let△wi,j define the (i, j)-th parameter in an update of the form△w ∈ Rq×p, at some
communication round t. For the sake of clarity, we will drop specific indexing of communication
rounds for now.
The variance of parameter (i, j) throughout allK clients is defined as,
VAR[△wi,j ] =
1
K
K∑
k=0
(△wki,j − µi,j)
2,
where µi,j =
1
K
∑K
k=1△w
k
i,j .
We then define Vc as the sum over all parameter variances in the update matrix as,
Vc =
1
q × p
q∑
i=0
p∑
j=0
VAR[△wi,j ].
Further, the Update scale Us is defined as,
Us =
1
q × p
q∑
i=0
p∑
j=0
µ2i,j .
4 Experiments
In order to test our proposed algorithm we simulate a federated setting. For the sake of compa-
rability, we choose a similar experimental setup as [5] did. We divide the sorted MNIST set into
shards. Consequently, each client gets two shards. This way most clients will have samples from
two digits only. A single client could thus never train a model on their data such that it reaches high
classification accuracy for all ten digits.
We are investigating differential privacy in the federated setting for scenarios of K ∈
{100, 1000, 10000}. In each setting the clients get exactly 600 data points. ForK ∈ {1000, 10000},
data points are repeated.
For all three scenariosK ∈ {100, 1000, 10000}we performed a cross-validation grid search on the
following parameters:
• Number of batches per client B
• Epochs to run on each client E
• Number of clients participating in each roundm
• The GM parameter σ
In accordance to [1] we fixed ǫ to the value of 8. During training we keep track of privacy
loss using the privacy accountant. Training is stopped once δ reaches e − 3, e − 5, e − 6 for
100, 1000 and 10000 clients, respectively. In addition, we also analyze the between clients vari-
ance over the course of training. The code for the experiments described above is available at:
https://github.com/cyrusgeyer/DiffPrivate_FedLearning.
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Algorithm 1 Client-side differentially private federated optimization. K is the number of partici-
pating clients; B is the local mini-batch size, E the number of local epochs, η is the learning rate,
{σ}Tt=0 is the set of variances for the GM. {mt}
T
t=0 determines the number of participating clients
at each communication round. ǫ defines the dp we aim for. Q is the threshold for δ, the probability
that ǫ-dp is broken. T is the number of communication rounds after which δ surpasses Q. B is a set
holding client’s data sliced into batches of size B
1: procedure SERVER EXECUTION
2: Initialize: w0,Accountant(ǫ,K) ⊲ initialize weights and the priv. accountant
3: for each round t = 1, 2, ... do
4: δ ← Accountant(mt, σt) ⊲ Accountant returns priv. loss for current round
5: if δ > Q then return wt ⊲ If privacy budget is spent, return current model
6: Zt ← random set ofmt clients ⊲ randomly allocate a set ofmt out of K clients
7: for each client k ∈ Zt in parallel do
8: △wkt+1, ζ
k ← ClientUpdate(k, wt) ⊲ client k’s update and the update’s norm
9: S = median{ζk}k∈Zt ⊲ median of norms of clients’ update
10: wt+1 ← wt +
1
m
(
∑K
k=1△w
k
t+1/max(1,
ζk
S
) +N (0, S2 · σ2)) ⊲ Update central model
11: function CLIENTUPDATE(k, wt)
12: w← wt
13: for each local Epoch i = 1, 2, ...E do
14: for batch b ∈ B do
15: w← w − η∇L(w; b) ⊲ mini batch gradient descent
16: △wt+1 = w − wt ⊲ clients local model update
17: ζ = ‖△wt+1‖2 ⊲ norm of update
18: return△wt+1, ζ ⊲ return clipped update and norm of update
Table 1: Experimental results for differentially private federated learning (Dp) and comparison to
non-differentially private federated learning (Non-dp). Scenarios of 100, 1000 and 10000 clients
for a privacy budget of ǫ = 8 . δ′ is the highest acceptable probability of ǫ-differential privacy
being broken. Once δ′ is reached, training is stopped. Accuracy denoted as ’ACC’, number of
communication as ’CR’ and communication costs as ’CC’.
Clients δ′ ACC CR CC
Non-dp 100 - 0.97 380 38000
Dp
100 e-3 0.78 11 550
1000 e-5 0.92 54 11880
10000 e-6 0.96 412 209500
5 Results
In the cross validation grid search we look for those models that reach the highest accuracy while
staying below the respective bound on δ. In addition, when multiple models reach the same accuracy,
the one with fewer needed communication rounds is preferred.
Table 1 holds the best models found for K ∈ {100, 1000, 10000}. We list the accuracy (ACC), the
number of communication rounds (CR) needed and the arising communication costs (CC). Commu-
nication costs are defined as the number of times a model gets send by a client over the course of
training, i.e.
∑T
t=0mt. In addition, as a benchmark, table 1 also holds the ACC, CR and CC of the
best performing non-differentially private model for K = 100. In Figure 1, the accuracy of all four
best performing models is depicted over the course of training.
In Figure 2, the accuracy of non-differentially private federated optimization for K = 100 is de-
picted again together with the between clients variance and the update scale over the course of
training.
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Figure 1: Accuracy of digit classification from non-IID MNIST-data held by clients over the course
of decentralized training. For differentially private federated optimization, dots at the end of accu-
racy curves indicate that the δ-threshold was reached and training therefore stopped.
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Figure 2: Scenario of 100 clients, non-differentially private: accuracy, between clients variance and
update scale over the course of federated optimization.
6 Discussion
As intuitively expected, the number of participating clients has a major impact on the achieved
model performance. For 100 and 1000 clients, model accuracy does not converge and stays sig-
nificantly below the non-differentially private performance. However, 78% and 92% accuracy for
K ∈ {100, 1000} are still substantially better than anything clients would be able to achieve when
only training on their own data. In domains whereK lays in this order of magnitude and differential
privacy is of utmost importance, such models would still substantially benefit any client participat-
ing. An example for such a domain are hospitals. Several hundred could jointly learn a model, while
information about a specific hospital stays hidden. In addition, the jointly learned model could be
used as an initialization for further client-side training.
For K = 10000, the differentially private model almost reaches accuracies of the non-differential
private one. This suggests that for scenarios where many parties are involved, differential privacy
comes at almost no cost in model performance. These scenarios include mobile phones and other
consumer devices.
In the cross-validation grid search we also found that raisingmt over the course of training improves
model performance. When looking at a single early communication round, lowering both mt and
σt in a fashion such that σ
2
t /mt stays constant, has almost no impact on the accuracy gain during
that round. however, privacy loss is reduced when both parameters are lowered. This means more
communication rounds can be performed later on in training, before the privacy budget is drained. In
subsequent communication rounds, a largemt is unavoidable to gain accuracy, and a higher privacy
cost has to be embraced in order to improve the model.
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This observation can be linked to recent advances of information theory in learning algorithms. As
observable in figure 2, Shwartz-Ziv and Tishby [8] suggest, we can distinguish two different phases
of training: label fitting and data fitting phase. During label fitting phase, updates by clients are
similar and thus Vc is low, as figure 2 shows. Uc however is high during this initial phase, as big
updates to the randomly initialized weights are performed. During data fitting phase Vc rises. The
individual updates △wk look less alike, as each client optimizes on their data set. Uc however
drastically shrinks, as a local optima of the global model is approached, accuracy converges and the
contributions cancel each other out to a certain extend. Figure 2 shows these dependencies of Vc
and Uc. We can conclude: i) At early communication rounds, small subsets of clients might still
contribute an average update △wt representative of the true data distribution ii) At later stages a
balanced (and therefore bigger) fraction of clients is needed to reach a certain representativity for an
update. iii) High Uc makes early updates less vulnerable to noise.
7 Conclusion
We were able to show through first empirical studies that differential privacy on a client level is
feasible and high model accuracies can be reached when sufficiently many parties are involved.
Furthermore, we showed that careful investigation of the data and update distribution can lead to
optimized privacy budgeting. For future work, we plan to derive optimal bounds in terms of signal to
noise ratio in dependence of communication round, data representativity and between-client variance
as well as further investigate the connection to information theory.
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